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STATE OF UTAH
OLOF NELSON CONSTRUCTION
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Case No.

7633

BRIEF OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COUNCIL,
INTERVENOR, HERETOFORE APPOINTED
AMICUS CURIAE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Industrial Relations Council, by leave of this
Honorable Court first had and obtained, files herewith
its brief as Amicus Curiae.
The questions raised by petitioners and appellants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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are of first in1pression before this lionorable Court
The questions involved are of great importance in this
area. rrhere is a great divergence of opinion among
these groups as to the application of the Utah law per.
taining to the question involved.
The respondents and appellees and the petitioners
and appellants have set forth the facts pertaining to
this case, and this intervenor will not, therefore, at this
time make any statement of facts, but will refer to
the facts in this case as they apply to the argument
presented.
The petitioners and appellants have set forth two
points in their brief. However, we believe that the point
as set forth in the brief of the respondents and appellees
clearly sets forth the point in question, and we will,
therefore, adopt that point of the respondents and appel.
lees and present our argument in relation thereto.
ARGUMENT
THE CLAIMANTS WERE UNEMPLOYED DUE TO 1t
STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED BECAUSE OF
A STRIKE INVOLVING THEIR GRADE, CLASS, OR GROUP
OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY OR ESTABLISHMEN'I
AT WHICH THEY WERE LAST EMPLOYED.

For the convenience of the court we quote herewith
Section 42-2a-5 (d), Utah Code Annotated 1943, the particular statute in question, which provides in part as
follows:
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
" (d) For any week in which it is found by
2
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the Commission that his unen1ploYJ.nent is due to
a stoppage of work which exists because of a
strike involving his grade, class, or group of
workers at the factory or establishment at which
he is or was last employed." (Italics ours.)
It is the position of this i:o.tervenor that for the
claimants to be eligible to the benefits of the Utah
Employment Security Act, it must be conclusively shown
that the unemployment of the claimants h~rein was not
due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a
strike involving their grade, class or group.
It is our further position that it must be shown that
the claimants were not a part of the group that was
involved in the strike. The mere fact that the claimants
and those employees who went out on strike did not have
a common employer does not, because of this fact, alter
or change the situation. In interpreting the Utah Employment Security Act, the question arises, were the
claimants unemployed due to a stoppage of work which
existed because of a strike involving their grade, class
or group1

It is our position that there is only one answer,
and that answer is "yes."
In labor relations, Labor Boards many times determine groups or bargaining units to include employees
of many employers, which is commonly referred to as a
multi-employer unit; that is, units or groups in which
the employees do not have a common employer. However, such groups are appropriate units and are so
determined by Labor Relations Boards.
3
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For assistance to this Honorable Court, we will
set forth decisions and instances where Labor Boards
have determined that multi-employer groups or bargaining units, for the best interests of all parties involved
and for the purpose of maintaining industrial peace,
are necessary and essential for the purposes of collective
bargaining. That is, to have groups in the same industry,
job classifications, etc., but not the same common employer.
As we understand the facts in this case, the Associated General Contractors of America, Intermountain
Branch, bargained for certain contractors who were
signatories to the agreement between the contractors
and the union. That the unions included various crafts,
which were known as the six basic crafts, to-wit: The
International Hod Carriers, Building and Common
Laborers Unio_n; the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America; the International Union of
Operating Engineers; the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America; the Operative Plasterers and Cement Finishers
Association; and the International Association of Bridge,
Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, all affiliated
with the American Federation of Labor and representing
the local unions of the state.
For many years the unions, that is, the six basic
crafts, have bargained as a group, with the contractors
as a group, and when a contract has been arrived at,
an identical contract is executed with the contractors
being signatory thereto.
4
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The pattern of collectiYe bargaining history has
been that the Associated General Contractors has been
the representative of the contractors as a group, and
the employees of that group have been and did constitute
an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, notwithstanding that they did not have a common employer, ·with the six basic crafts acting as a unit.
It is our opinion from the facts in this case-that
is, the collective bargaining history-that the employers
herein constitute a multi-employer bargaining unit. Such
a group constitutes an appropriate unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining. The decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board would sustain our position with
respect to this matter.

\Ve feel that it would be enlightening to this Honorable Court to refer to the Utah Labor Relations Act,
Title 49, Chapter 1, and particularly Section 17, Subsection (b), as well as the same comparable section of the
Labor :Management Relations Act of 1947, known as
Title 29, Section 159, Subsection (b), which provides in
part as follows :
Utah Labor Relations Act:
"49-1-17- Collective Bargaining-Representatives. (b) The board shall decide in each case
whether, in order to insure to employees the full
benefit of their right to self-organization and to
collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate
the policies of this act, the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision there of."

5
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Labor :Management Act of 1947, as amended:
"Title 29, Sec. 159, Subsection (b) USCA.
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether,
in order to insure to employees the full benefit
of their right to self-organization and to collective
bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of sections 151-166 of this title, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof."
The Utah Labor Relations Board, as far as this
intervenor can ascertain, has not yet had the occasion
to make a finding of what is referred to many times
as a multi-employer unit. However, the National Labor
Relations Board, on many occasions, has done so under
and by virtue of the provisions of Title 29 above referred
to.
For the convenience of this court, we think it would
be enlightening to refer this court to National Labor
Relations Board decisions on the appropriateness of
multi-employer bargaining units. The Board has held
that certain groups or units constitute an appropriate
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, notwithstanding the fact the employees do not have a common
employer.
For illustration, just recently the National Labor
Relations Board directed that an election be held in
seven dairies and ice cream plants in the State of Utah.
These plants distributed ninety percent of the milk and
ice cream in the State of Utah. In conducting this election the employees were treated as though having one

6
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common en1ployer, notwithstanding the fact that the
seven dairies and ice cream manufacturers involved
had plants from Ogden on the north to Cedar City on
the south. In conducting the election among the employees for the purpose of determining whom they desired
to represent them for the purpose of collective bargaining, the election was conducted as though all of these
employees worked for one employer, and the Board
directed that the union to be designated must receive
a majority of the votes of the employees voting, without
regard to their places of employment.
This case has not yet come out in the Advance
Sheets of the Labor Relations Manual and, therefore,
does not have a reference number.
The National Labor Relations Board's decisions on
the appropriateness o£ multi-employer bargaining units
make it clear that the controlling factor in such cases
is the factual existence of a history and pattern of joint
bargaining. Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and Concentrating Company, 89 NLRB No. 8 (1950); Brewery
Proprietors of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 62 NLRB 163
(1945) ; Waterfront Employers Association of the Pacific
Coast, 71 NLRB 80 (1946). The Board summarized its
position on this point recently in the Bunker Hill case
as follows:
"The Board has held that the essential element for establishing a multi-employer unit is
participation by a group of employers, whether
members or non-members of an association, either
personally or through an authorized representative, in joint bargaining negotiations. We have

7
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found such units appropriate although the particular employers involved did not belong to a
formal employer association, each employer had
its own representative present during negotiations, and the negotiations resulted in the execution of separate, but identical contracts."

Past bargaining history has been ruled conclusive
by the National Labor Relations Board in numerous
cases upholding multi-employer units against attempts
to carve out single-plant units. Rayonier, Incorporated,
52 NLRB 1269 (1943); Hazel-Atlas Glass Company,
59 NLRB 706 (1944); Kalamazoo Stove and Furnace
Company, 61 NLRB 1041 (1945); Springfield Plywood
Corporation, 61 NLRB 1295 (1945); Richard Young Co.,
64 NLRB 733 (1945) ; Waterfront Employers Association of the Pacific Coast, 71 NLRB 80 (1946); Cloth
Laying Appliances Corporation, 78 NLRB 785 (1948);
Geo. J. Renner Brewing Company, 79 NLRB 1449
(1948) ; Pacific American Ship Owners Association, 80
NLRB 622 (1948) ; Furniture Firms of Duluth, 81 NLRB
1318 (1949); Air Conditioning Company of Southern
California, 81 NLRB 946 (1949) ; New England Fish
Company, 83 NLRB 656 (1949); Balaban & Katz, 87
NLRB No. 133 (1949); Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining
and Concentrating Company, 89 NLRB No. 8 (1950);
Cleveland Builders Supply Co., 90 NLRB No. 136 (1950).
In the Springfield case, supra, both points are relied
on as follows:
"This system of dealing which has become
traditional among the group of plywood operators
8
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and locals who have participated therein, has
proved conducive to the orderly functioning of
collective bargaining and has contributed to uniformity and stability of labor relations in a comparatively large portion of the plywood manufacturing industry. The record indicates that
during the period covered by uniform labor agreements and joint collective bargaining on the part
of both unions and employers, the plywood manufacturing industry as represented by members of
the CIO group in the Employer Association, has
been singularly free from major industrial strife.

* * * * *
"On the basis of the facts above referred to,
and upon the entire record in the case, we are of
the opinion that, notwithstanding evidence indicating the appropriateness, from a functional
viewpoint, of a bargaining unit confined to one
plant of a single employer, the course of collective
bargaining, which since 1940 has been conducted
on a multiple-employer or Association-wide basis,
1nust govern the scope of the appropriate unit in
the present instance. In reaching this conclusion,
we find that the facts in the present proceeding
are substantially similar to those in prior cases
in which 1nultiple-employer units have been found
appropriate, where, notwithstanding the inforn1al
character of the employer associations therein
concerned, the members of such associations have
'established a practice of joint action in regard
to labor relations by negotiation with an effective
employee organization, and have, by their customary adherence to the uniform labor agreements
resulting therefrom, demonstrated their desire to
be bound by group rather than by individual action'."
We believe that the Utah Employment Security
9
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Act in some particulars is in pari materia with the
Utah Labor Relations Act, although passed at different
sessions of the Utah State Legislature.
It was the purpose of the legislature in enacting
42-2a-5d, Utah Code Annotated 1943, not to permit
employees in their grade, class or group to be eligible
for benefits if their unemployment is due to a stoppage
of work which existed because of a strike.
The Utah Labor Relations Act was amended in
1943, and the legislature at that time added a provision
with respect to strikes. We refer to Section 49-1-16,
Subsection (c), which provides as follows:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employee individually or in concert with others
to cooperate in engaging in, promoting, or inducing picketing (not constituting an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed free speech), boycotting
or any other overt concomitant of a strike unless
a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the
employees of an einployer against whom such acts
are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot
to call a strike."
The Utah Labor Relations Act empowers the Utah
Labor Board to determine what constitutes an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining;
and as we have quoted for the convenience of the court,
the Utah Act is practically identical with that of the
N ationa1 Act.
As we have stated, a multi-employer unit does
constitute an appropriate unit, and has been so held
to be appropriate in many cases.

10
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It will be noted fron1 the above section of the Utah
Labor Relations Act that it is an unfair labor practice
for an en1ployee, individually or in concert with others,
to strike unless a majority in a collective bargaining
unit has voted by secret ballot to call a strike.
It can be readily understood by the enactment of
the above section, that the legislature wanted to avert
strikes in eYery possible way. Experience has taught
that many times strikes are prompted by a representative of labor placing a picket line in front of a place of
business even though the employees themselves have not
by majority vote, voted for a strike. The legislature
no doubt intended to assure employers and the public
alike that a strike would not be called until and unless
a majority of employees in the unit for the purpose
of collective bargaining voted by majority vote in favor
of such a strike.
From the briefs filed in this case, it is apparent
that the strike vote was not held in accordance with
the Utah law; that is, in the appropriate unit, but held
with two individual employers. The mere fact that they
did not follow the Utah law does not have any bearing
in the instant case.
For the purpose of argument, let us assume that
they had complied with the law and had the strike vote
conducted as the law intended; that was in the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
If that were the case, then we have employees (the claimants herein) participating in strike action, and in furtherance of the use of strike action, using economic force
11
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against two employers. We then have these employees
who have put into operation strike action, and the economic weapons at their command to enforce such strike
action, asking the benefits of unemployment compensation insurance. The Utah Employment Security Act
did not intend that those employees participating in
strike actions should be entitled to the benefits of the
Act.
Could it be said that the claimants involved herein
were not parties or participants in a strike action~
We believe that they were in all respects.
These claimants and other employees caused, by
their own action, the strike, and no doubt did so with
the full knowledge of what its consequences would mean.
As we understand the facts, even after the strike
was called, negotiations were continued with the employer group, thereby the representatives of these claimants recognizing that the multi-employer unit still existed and was in full force and effect.
We firmly believe that when strike action is put
into effect as it was in this case in the appropriate unit,
the employees in that unit, if they find themselves unemployed by virtue of using that strike action, are not
entitled to the benefits of the Utah Employment Security Act.
Without any question, these claimants were a part
and parcel of an employee group who was unemployed
due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a
strike involving their group, and which they put into
effect. It certainly would be contrary to the intent of

12
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the law to have employees put into effect strike action,
and yet be eligible for the benefits of the Act.
CONCLUSION
It has been our purpose in this brief to be of assistance to the court to treat several phases of the question
involved which we feel have not been treated by some
of the briefs. We have not attempted by this brief to
cover all the phases of the question involved, but only
those which we feel have not yet been treated by the
various briefs.
Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS H. CALLISTER,
Attorney for Industrial
Relations Council,
Amicus Curiae.
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